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Abstract
In a market where sellers are heterogeneous with respect of the quality of
their good and are more informed than buyers, high quality sellers’ chances to
trade might depend on their ability to inform buyers about the quality of the
goods they offer. We study how the strength of competition among sellers affects
the ability of sellers of high quality goods to achieve communication by means
of appropriate pricing decisions in the context of a market populated by a large
number of strategic price setting sellers and a large number of buyers. When
competition among sellers is weak high quality sellers are able to use prices as
a signaling device and this enables them to trade. By contrast, strong competi-
tion among sellers inhibits the role of prices as signals of high quality, and high
quality sellers are driven out of the market.
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1 Introduction
A buyer interested in a specific digital camera could find out the list of retailers’
price quotes at shopper.com in just a few seconds. For any model, such a list would
invariably contain substantially dispersed prices.1 Why would these price quotes not
obey the law of one price? After all, if consumers have access to market prices at a
negligible cost, one would expect all cameras of the same model and brand to trade
approximately at the same price.
The Internet allows consumers to observe prices of any specific camera at almost no
cost. Whether the Internet is as informative about other relevant characteristics of the
product they are interested in, is far less clear. For example, Lin and Scholten (2005)
document that not all the firms selling electronic products are explicit on whether
they sell brand new or refurbished or open box products. Information about delivery,
assistance, and customer care in general is also much less available than price quotes,
and is rather opaque anyway. Since the availability of hard information is typically
limited in online markets, sellers may attempt to signal quality through the choice of
price.
When sellers are more informed than buyers, the ability of sellers endowed with
high quality goods to inform buyers about the quality of their goods might indeed be
crucial in keeping these sellers from being wiped out by price competition. However,
is this ability independent of the competitive pressure faced by the sellers? Does price
competition alter the effectiveness of price as a signaling device?
The signaling role of sellers’ strategic price decisions in the presence of asymmetric
information has been the subject of extensive research and a summary of the related
literature is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Within this literature, important
contributions including Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Laffont and Maskin (1987), Bag-
well and Riordan (1991) Bagwell (1991), Overgard (1987) and Ellingsen (1997) have
focused on the case of monopoly.2 Bagwell (1991) finds that, with a downward sloping
1Various studies document the presence of persistent significant price dispersion in internet markets
for final goods. See, for instance, Clay, Krishnan and Wolff (2001) for the case of electronic bookstores
and Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004) for the case of consumer electronic products.
2Representative contributions focusing on other market structures include Laffont and Maskin
(1989) for the case of oligopoly and Cooper and Ross (1982) for the case of free entry, Wolinski
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demand, the only equilibrium which satisfies the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps
1987) is a separating equilibrium in which the high quality is traded at a higher price
but sells less than the low quality. Ellingsen (1997), in a model with one seller and
one buyer with inelastic demand, finds that there is a unique equilibrium surviving
D1 (Cho and Kreps 1987). The equilibrium is separating: the seller sells with prob-
ability one at the low price and with probability less than one (but positive) at the
high price. Hence, the general consensus is that, in the absence of competition, a high
quality seller is able to signal quality by distorting his price upwards and reducing the
volume of trade relative to the first best.
The main contribution of the present paper is to understand to what extent (and
under what conditions) this conclusion applies when sellers might face competition.
We identify two regimes: weak competition (buyers outnumber sellers of low qual-
ity goods), and strong competition (buyers are outnumbered by low quality sellers).
When competition is weak, different qualities trade at different prices and in different
amounts. This matches the standard result obtained with monopoly. By converse,
when competition is strong, only the low quality is traded in any robust equilibrium.
In this case, prices do not serve as signals of quality and sellers of high quality goods
are driven out of the market. We thus establish a causal link between the competitive
pressure faced by sellers and the information conveyed through prices, as well as with
the associated volume of trade and its quality. This is, to our knowledge, a novel result
within the literature on the signaling role of prices.
The result is established in a model where there are two qualities of the same
good, and therefore two types of sellers. However, as shown in the appendix, the
result holds in the more general case of an arbitrary number of qualities. The stronger
the competitive pressure faced by the sellers, the lower the number of qualities that
will be traded and the associated degree of price heterogeneity observed in the market.
Prices serve as signals only when different types of sellers have different incentives
to announce a particular price. How could this depend on the competitive pressure
faced by sellers? Consider the strong competition regime. Low quality sellers undercut
each other until, in equilibrium, they announce the zero profit price. So long as sellers’
(1983) on search costs, and Jansen and Roy (2002) on durable goods.
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valuations are increasing in the quality of the good, sellers of high quality goods cannot
afford to sell at the price that gives zero profits to low quality sellers. Yet, in an
equilibrium in which low quality sellers make zero profits, no trade can occur at higher
prices. High quality sellers are thus unable to trade. Since both types of sellers make
zero profits, they have identical incentives to deviate to any price at which high quality
sellers would be willing to trade. Off-equilibrium prices cannot be used to signal the
quality of the good. As a result, high quality sellers are driven out of the market.
Consider now the weak competition regime. Buyers compete and, therefore, low
quality sellers make positive profits in equilibrium. Prices thus become an effective
communication device. Consider, for instance, a candidate equilibrium in which only
the low quality is traded. High quality sellers, who in equilibrium are out of the market,
have an incentive to announce any off-equilibrium price greater than their reservation
utility, whenever there is a positive chance to sell at those prices. Low quality sellers
would announce such prices only if the chances to sell were sufficiently good, since they
would make strictly positive profits by announcing the equilibrium price. Therefore,
sellers of high quality goods are more seemly to benefit from announcing such prices
than sellers of low quality goods. High quality sellers can thus use these prices to
signal the quality of their goods. As a result, high quality sellers are never driven out
of the market when competition is weak. In this case, the robust equilibrium is one in
which both qualities are traded and the higher quality trades at a higher price.
Interestingly, incentive compatibility for the low quality sellers requires that the
probability to sell at the higher price should be lower than one. Independently of
the strength of demand, some high quality sellers will always be unable to sell, even
when the price of high quality goods exceeds sellers’ reservation price. The price
should fall to equate demand and supply, but imperfect information inhibits such a
market-clearing role of prices. Thus, sellers of high quality could be rationed in a
sense similar to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).3 On the other hand, the upward pressure
on prices induced by signaling reduces the downward pressure on prices resulting from
competition among sellers. This is consistent with Daughety and Reinganum (2005)
3See also Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000) on how rationing can emerge in the presence of inter-
markets competition.
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and (2007) who find that duopolists might benefit from the upward distortion on prices
of high quality goods due to signaling. Intuitively, a side effect of the upward distortion
is that prices become closer to cartel prices.
Following the seminal work by Akerlof (1970), the case of a market with competi-
tion between price setting sellers more informed than buyers has been considered by
Wilson (1979 and 1980). He documents how price dispersion can emerge as the result
of a separating equilibrium. However, “the absence of restrictions on the expectations
of agents outside the set of [equilibrium] prices actually announced” [Wilson, 1980,
page 126] implies a huge degree of indeterminacy. Many types of equilibria could ac-
tually exist, each associated with a particular degree of price dispersion.4 Subsequent
works have have exploited the predictive power of forward induction refinements to
address this issue. Consistent with the rest of the literature, we use D1 to restrict
off-equilibrium beliefs.5 The result is a set of robust equilibria which share all the
same unique outcome in terms of prices, quantity and quality of trade.
Although the issue of equilibrium selection is a delicate one, the obvious advan-
tage of using a strong solution concept is that the predictive power of the theory is
greatly enhanced – whether high quality sellers are driven out of the market or not
only depends on the competitive pressure faced by sellers. Since different qualities
always trade at different prices in robust equilibria, price dispersion is also uniquely
determined by the strength of competition.6
Competition also determines the magnitude of price distortions due to the use of
prices as signals. In the strong competition regime, the upward distortion is extreme:
high quality sellers can only reveal their type by announcing prices so high that no
trade can take place. By contrast, when competition is weak, high quality sellers are
able to separate themselves with little or no distortion on prices.
Recent contributions use the mechanism design methodology to study the max-
imum level of welfare achievable in an economy characterized by asymmetric infor-
4As already mentioned, Laffont and Maskin (1989) study an oligopolistic market where sellers
can signal quality through their prices. They conclude that, even in the case of just two firms, the
problem of characterizing all perfect Bayesian equilibria seems intractable.
5See Banks and Sobel (1987) and Cho and Kreps (1987).
6Villeneuve (2003) considers privately informed insurers competing to insure a single consumer.
Differently from our framework, the type – which is determined by the consumer’s risk profile – is
the same for all insurers.
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mation. Gul and Postlewaite (1992) study the conditions under which an economy
characterized by asymmetric information can achieve efficiency as it becomes large.
Muthoo and Mutuswami (2005) characterize the second best solution in markets with
quality uncertainty where sellers are more informed than buyers.
Our approach is complementary to theirs to the extent that we study the prevailing
equilibrium associated with a specific price convention. This enables us to find a
relationship between competition and observable features of the market such as price
dispersion. Moreover, we can assess how the use of prices as a communication device
could affect the level of welfare and the distribution of surplus between buyers and
sellers. In particular, while such a role of price could help high quality sellers to
trade, it does not always lead to a welfare improvement. Equilibria in which prices are
uninformative (pooling) might generate higher welfare. However, we show that when
sellers are free to set their prices, these equilibria fail D1.
In many cases, policy makers have argued that regulations restricting competition
serve the purpose of maintaining the quality of products and services and protect-
ing customers from malpractice. This is the case, for instance, of professional ser-
vices defined as services that require practitioners to display a high level of technical
knowledge which consumers might not have. Our results suggest that while limiting
competition does raise the average quality traded in the market, it also reduces the
surplus available to the buyers. Accordingly, when there are positive gains from trad-
ing low quality goods, buyers (customers) are unambiguously better off in the strong
competition regime, in spite of the adverse effect on the quality of goods.
Similarly, we show that, when high quality sellers are driven out of the market by
competition, imposing a price floor might help to restore trade of the high quality.
This is broadly consistent with recent evidence by Huck et al. (2007) (although their
environment is slightly different from the one considered here). Intuitively, a price floor
would prevent the profits of low quality sellers from falling to zero when competition
is strong. This would allow high quality sellers to separate themselves by charging
prices above the price floor. In particular cases, price controls might thus increase
efficiency. On the other hand, price controls have relevant redistributive effects. Any
gain in overall efficiency necessarily comes at the cost of a lower consumer surplus.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section two we present the model. In Section
three we describe the equilibrium concept and its refinements, and we characterize the
set of robust equilibria. Section four describes the features of the equilibrium outcome
and discusses potential policy interventions. Section five analyzes the robustness of the
results to changes in the information structure. A final section concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We consider a large market populated by B buyers, and S sellers. The set S of sellers
is indexed by s = 1, ...., S; s ∈ S. Each seller is endowed with one unit of good.
Goods come in two different qualities, q ∈ {h, l}, where l (h) stands for low (high).
The general case of a finite number of qualities is analyzed in the appendix. We
refer to sellers endowed with quality q as sellers of quality (or type) q. The quality
of each seller is decided by nature: each seller has a probability λ to be of quality
h and probability 1 − λ to be of quality l. The distribution of qualities is common
knowledge. However, buyers cannot observe individual qualities. Moreover, quality is
not verifiable ex post. The monetary utility that individual sellers of type q derive
from their good is v(q) > 0, with v(h) > v(l).
The set B of buyers is indexed by b = 1, ..., B; b ∈ B. Each buyer consumes
either one unit of good or nothing. Buyers share identical preferences defined by the
monetary utility function u(q) > 0, with u(h) > u(l). We impose u(q) > v(q) for
all q ∈ {h, l}, which implies that under full information there are always gains from
trade to be realized. For expositional purposes, we also impose u(l) < v(h): buyers
are never willing to buy a low quality good at any price that is profitable for a high
quality seller.
We are mainly interested in characterizing the behavior of agents in a large market.
Accordingly, we consider the case in which both the number of buyers and the number
of sellers go to infinity and their ratio, B/S, converges to some value θ ∈ R+.7
The market functions as follows.
7As it is well known (see Judd 1985), the use of the law of large numbers with a continuum of
agents may be inappropriate.
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Pricing
At stage zero, each seller s observes his quality. Endowed with this piece of information,
sellers move first, by simultaneously choosing their action, while buyers do nothing.
The action ps played by seller s consists in announcing a price p ∈ [0, p], where p is
finite and strictly greater than u(h), so that in equilibrium trade never occurs at p.
For simplicity, we adopt the convention that sellers who choose not to trade always
announce p. A strategy for seller s is a map from {l, h} into the set A of probability
distributions over [0, p]. An action profile for the sellers is a collection p ≡ {p1, ...., pS},
with ps ∈ [0, p].
Beliefs
At stage 1, buyers observe the prices announced by sellers at stage zero and choose
whether to buy and at what prices. Buyers’ prior beliefs assign a probability λ to the
event that an individual seller s is of type h. Upon observing the price p announced
by a seller s, and given the sellers’ action profile p, buyers’ (posterior) beliefs that the
seller announcing p is of type q are denoted with the conditional probability function
σ(q|p,p).
Demand
We do not model explicitly strategic interaction between buyers since this would re-
quire the choice of a mechanism matching buyers and sellers. Since our results are to
some extent independent of the specific market mechanism, we choose to simplify the
analysis by specifying only the minimum requirements that the demand side must sat-
isfy for the results. As will be made clear in the next section, this reduces to assuming
that the essential properties of a market a` la Bertrand are preserved.
We therefore assume that, after observing p, buyers play an underlying subgame in
which each buyer chooses an action (or a set of actions) which may or may not result
in a purchase. For instance, buyers can compare prices, inquire about availability, and
then choose whether to buy at some price. The outcome of this game is a function
J(p;p), J : [0, p] → [0, 1] which, for any p, specifies the probability to sell at some
price p. Given that all sellers are ex-ante identical and they move simultaneously, the
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function J(p;p) will be the same to all sellers. Finally, we denote with K the share of
buyers who are able to obtain a good. The values of J(p;p) and K are connected by
the restriction that the number of goods sold must equal the number of goods bought.
Denote with s(p) the fraction of sellers announcing p. Using the law of large numbers,
this restriction can be stated as
∑
p
s(p)J(p;p) = Kθ (1)
where both sides are scaled by the total number of goods in the economy (S).
3 Equilibrium
We base our equilibrium analysis on the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE). We now discuss the restrictions that sellers’ strategies, beliefs σ, and buy-
ers’ behavior (summarized by the function J) must satisfy.
Sellers’ strategies
The expected payoff of a seller of type q ∈ {l, h} announcing price p when prices
announced by all sellers are summarized by p is J(p;p)[p− v(q)]. In equilibrium, the
sellers’ strategy profile must satisfy the following two restrictions
R1 All sellers play best replies given other sellers’ strategies, beliefs σ, and J(.; .).
R2 Strategies are symmetric: all sellers of the same quality announce the same prices
with the same probabilities.
Condition R1 is entirely standard and requires no explanation. Condition R2 is
commonly invoked when dealing with many agents. Symmetric strategies are usually
imposed to simplify the equilibrium analysis. With price-setting sellers, this particular
condition is further motivated by the fact that buyers’ beliefs are derived from sellers’
strategies. If strategies were not symmetric, buyers could assign different probabilities
to be of a given type to sellers announcing the same price. This is at odds with the
conventional idea of a large market in which trade is not affected by the identity of
individuals. Moreover, since we allow for mixed strategies, symmetric strategies do not
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rule out asymmetric actions as an equilibrium outcome. Thus, imposing symmetric
strategies does not imply a great loss of generality in terms of agents’ behavior.
We also restrict our attention to equilibria in which sellers randomize over prices by
using distributions with finite support. This restriction, together with the assumption
that all sellers adopt the same strategies, permits to exploit the law of large numbers
(see below).
Beliefs
R3 All buyers share the same beliefs and these are derived from sellers’ strategies
using Bayes rule where possible;
R4 Buyers’ beliefs about a seller announcing a given price are not affected by the
price announced by another seller, even in the presence of deviations.8
Condition [R3] is again standard. Symmetry, together with the assumption that
buyers’ beliefs obey Bayes’ rule, imply that buyers should assign the same probability
to be high quality to any pair of sellers taking the same action. Condition R4 implies
that beliefs about seller s are independent of other sellers’ actions, even in the presence
of deviations (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 332). This condition follows from the
fact that sellers different from s have no information about s’s type that is not also
available to the buyers.
Buyers’ behavior
As already mentioned, rather than assuming a specific market structure, we consider
a broad range of possible interactions. We require however that the function J(p,p)
satisfy some familiar properties of competitive behavior,
R5 For all p, and beliefs σ, the function J(p;p) satisfies:
i) J(p;p) = 0 for all p such that σ(h|p,p)u(h) + [1− σ(h|p,p)]u(l) < p.
ii) If at some p J(p;p) > 0 and there exists some p′ such that
σ(h|p′,p)u(h) + [1− σ(h|p′,p)]u(l)− p′ >
σ(h|p,p)u(h) + [1− σ(h|p,p)]u(l)− p (2)
8Formally, this is equivalent to saying that, for all p, pˆ, p, pˆ, and q, σ(q|p,p) = σ(q|pˆ, pˆ) if p = pˆ.
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then J(p′;p) = 1.
iii) If K < 1, then J(p,p) = 1 for all p such that
σ(h|p,p)u(h) + [1− σ(h|p,p)]u(l) > p (3)
Condition [i] is the result of a standard participation constraint. If, given beliefs,
buyers expect to make a loss at p, no buyer would buy at p. Hence, the probability to
sell must be zero. Condition [ii] says that if at p the probability to sell is positive and,
given beliefs, there is another price p′ at which buyers make higher surplus, then the
probability to sell at p′ must be one. Intuitively, it is possible to sell at p only if at all
prices that guarantee a better deal to the buyer there is no excess supply. This is akin
to assuming Bertrand competition when supply is inelastic. Condition [iii] says that if
there are buyers who are unable to obtain a good, then it must be possible to sell with
probability one at all prices that, given beliefs, leave the buyer with a positive surplus.
Again, the intuition is obvious. Notice also that conditions [i]-[iii] do not impose any
restriction on how beliefs should vary according to the observed price. As it usually
happens in the presence of adverse selection, the prices that leave the highest expected
surplus to the buyer are not necessarily the lowest.
Conditions [i]-[iii] are natural when search costs are not particularly high. As
observed by Bester (1993), this is exactly the case when we should expect posted
prices as opposed to bargaining. Our results thus apply to any specific market setting
where sellers post prices and buyers interact in a way that is compatible with R5.
For an immediate example, consider a situation in which buyers arrive sequentially
and choose at which price to buy and then select at random among the sellers who
have announced that price and have not sold to previous buyers. This is reminiscent
of customers visiting a price comparison site listing sellers’ quotes. Another example
is provided in the working paper version of this paper. There, symmetric buyers
simultaneously choose the price at which to buy. If at some price there is excess
demand (supply), the purchase (sale) is allocated through a lottery. This is also the
approach taken in Wilson (1980). A third example is a situation in which, after
observing the prices posted by the sellers, buyers simultaneously submit a ranking of
the prices at which they accept to buy. A seller is then matched with a buyer only
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when all sellers offering prices that are better placed in the buyers’ rankings have been
able to sell their goods.
As already mentioned, we are interested in the behavior of a market characterized
by a large number of agents. The law of large numbers works on two levels here. First,
the individual realizations of Nature’s draws are irrelevant: the fraction of type h (resp.
l) sellers in the market is always equal to λ (resp. 1 − λ). Second, given symmetry
and the assumption that agents randomize over distributions with finite support, in-
dividual realizations of agents’ randomization are also irrelevant. In equilibrium, the
fraction of sellers announcing a given price is certain. Given R1-R5, in the remain-
der of the paper, we will denote simply with σ(q|p) the posterior probability that a
seller announcing price p is of type q (or, equivalently, the fraction of type q sellers
among sellers announcing p). Also, action profiles will be omitted when referring the
probability to make a sale. This will be denoted simply as J(p).
Equilibria can take different forms:
a. Separating equilibria, in which, by definition, different seller-types take different
actions;
b. Pooling equilibria, in which all seller-types take the same action;
c. Partially separating or Hybrid equilibria, in which heterogenous poolings of sellers
take different actions.
Associated with this variety of equilibria is a great deal of indeterminacy with respect
to the market’s outcome in terms of prices, traded quantities and qualities, as well as
with respect to the associated expected payoffs of market’s participants. For this very
reason it is important to investigate how a robustness analysis helps restricting the set
of possible equilibria.
3.1 Restrictions on off-equilibrium beliefs
The high degree of indeterminacy is due to a typical “unsent message” problem: if
a seller deviates to a price p that is announced with probability zero in equilibrium,
Bayes’ rule cannot determine the posterior beliefs of the buyers. Thus, upon observing
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a profile p containing the deviation p, buyers could hold arbitrary beliefs about the
quality of the seller who is announcing p. Therefore, we impose that buyers’ off-
equilibrium beliefs be consistent with a commonly used equilibrium refinement.
R6 Buyers’ off-equilibrium beliefs satisfy D1 (Cho and Kreps 1987).
In this section we discuss how this restriction can be used to eliminate equilibria
in the case of many buyers and sellers.9 If seller s deviates and announces a new
price p, his probability to sell at p depends on whether p is more or less appealing
to buyers than the prices announced by other sellers. Buyers’ beliefs about the seller
who deviated are determined by D1. What beliefs do they hold about sellers who
did not deviate? If a seller sticks to his equilibrium strategy, beliefs about him are
not affected by the deviation of another seller. This follows from restriction R4.10
As a result, buyers’ beliefs about sellers who did not deviate are the same as in the
candidate equilibrium.
We now describe how the refinement works in practice. Given a candidate equilib-
rium, we want to determine the extent to which a deviation can signal to the buyer
that the seller who is deviating is of type h. Clearly enough, a type h seller would never
deviate to a price p < v(h) since he could only lose from this action. Intuitively, given
a deviation p ≥ v(h), if type h sellers strictly benefit from deviating to p whenever
type l sellers weakly benefit from the same deviation, then buyers assign probability
zero to the event that p is announced by type l. More precisely, denote with J l and
Jh the critical values of the probability to sell when announcing p such that sellers of
type l and h respectively would be indifferent between deviating by announcing p and
playing their equilibrium strategy. Denoting with pi∗s(q) the equilibrium value of type
9Mailath et al. (1993) point out that the D1-robust outcome may not converge to the full infor-
mation outcome as buyers’ information becomes “almost” perfect (e.g. when λ approaches one or to
zero in our setup). In a monopolistic framework, Adriani and Deidda (2009) show that this may be
problematic. As will become clear, the discontinuity affects the D1-robust outcome in our game when
λ is close to one. However, allowing for “continuous” equilibria when λ is close to one would change
some quantitative results, but not the main qualitative results (i.e. what qualities are traded).
10The intuition is that the seller who deviated does not possess any information about the quality
of sellers who did not, that is not available also to the buyers.
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Consider a deviation p such that p − v(h) > pi∗s(h). According to R6, if J l > Jh,
buyers conclude that the deviating seller is of type l with probability zero, that is
σ(l|p) = 0.11 In words, if the critical value of the probability to sell such that a seller
is indifferent between deviating or not is lower for a high quality seller than for a
low quality one, a high quality seller is in a sense “more seemly to benefit” from the
deviation.
Therefore, an equilibrium fails D1 if, based on beliefs refined in such a way, a
seller would profit from deviating given that all other sellers stick to their equilibrium
strategies. Conversely, an equilibrium is robust to D1 if either of the two is true:
1) There is no deviation p at which buyers’ refined beliefs are such that the seller
announcing p is of low quality with probability zero, 2) If such p exist(s), then no
seller must profit from deviating to p.
Given D1, buyers’ beliefs assign probability zero to type l whenever the condition
J l ≤ Jh is violated. Another way to interpret R6 becomes apparent when substituting





In words, the opportunity cost (pi∗(q)) of a deviation p relative to the potential gain
(p− v(q)) must be smaller for a low quality seller than for a high quality one.
11More precisely, let p denote an action profile for the sellers comprising a deviation p. Let αB
denote a strategy profile for the buyers in the buyers’ subgame. Let MBRP (p) denote the set of
profiles comprising only mixed strategies for which it is possible to find beliefs and some profile of
strategy for other buyers such that they are best replies given p. Finally, let
R1(l|p) ≡ {αB ∈MBRP (p) : J(p,p) ≥ J l} (6)
and
R2(h|p) ≡ {αB ∈MBRP (p) : J(p,p) > Jh}. (7)
According to D1, if R1(l|p) ⊂ R2(h|p), then σ(l|p) = 0. Throughout the paper, we will consider
deviations p such that u(h)−p > σ(h|p′)[u(h)−p′]+(1−σ(h|p′))[u(l)−p′], where p′ is some price such
that J(p′) > 0. Hence, one can always find beliefs such that buying at p with any probability between
0 and 1 is consistent with a best reply for a buyer (given some strategy profile for other buyers). It
is then immediate to build profiles such that, for any j ∈ [0, 1], there exists αB ∈ MBRP (p) such
that J(p,p) = j. This in turn ensures that J l < Jh is necessary and sufficient for R1(l|p) ⊂ R2(h|p).
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For the purposes of the robustness analysis we distinguish the candidate equilibria
into two broad categories on the basis of how many qualities are traded:
Definition 1. A type I equilibrium is a PBE where both qualities are traded. A Type
II equilibrium is a PBE where only the low quality is traded.
It is worth noting that, in general, there would be a third category, which includes
those equilibria in which no quality is traded. However, as it turns out, the low quality
is always traded given our assumptions.12
3.2 Type I equilibria: both qualities are traded
Type I equilibria can take two forms: a. Separating equilibria (SE); b. Pooling
equilibria (PE) and Hybrid equilibria (HE). Rather than characterizing all equilibria
and then discard those which fail D1, we only characterize equilibria that pass D1.
Let us analyze PE and HE, first. In any PE, by definition, there is a single equi-
librium price p∗ at which both high and low qualities are traded. In HE sellers of
the same type may announce different prices and there is at least one price that is
announced with positive probability by both types.
It is well known that D1 tends to select SE (see Cho and Sobel, 1990). The next
lemma shows that also in the present model, within the set of type I equilibria, D1
discards PE and HE:
Lemma 1. No pooling/hybrid equilibrium of type I survives D1.
Proof. See Appendix.
In any PE or HE where both qualities are traded, sellers of type h, who face a
higher opportunity cost of selling (v(h) > v(l)), make lower equilibrium profits than
sellers of type l. Hence, sellers of type h have a lower opportunity cost of deviating.
Being aware of this, buyers infer that any deviation to a higher price must come from
a high quality seller. Therefore, sellers of type h would find it optimal to stand out of
the crowd by announcing a price that is slightly higher than the equilibrium price at
which both qualities are traded. Accordingly, no PE or HE of type I is ever robust:
equilibria of type I that are robust to D1 could only include SE.
12Consider an equilibrium where all sellers announce prices at which trade does not occur. Given
K < 1, J(p) = 1 for all p < u(l) independently of off-equilibrium beliefs. Then, deviating and
announcing p ∈ (v(l), u(l)) is always profitable for a seller of type l.
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In a separating equilibrium, low quality sellers announce a price pl, while high
quality sellers announce a different price ph 6= pl. Prices constitute a perfect signal of
quality: σ(h|ph) = 1, and σ(h|pl) = 0. When a good is exchanged at pq, q ∈ {l, h},
the buyer obtains u(q)− pq. In any SE, ph and pl satisfy
[pl − v(l)]J(pl) ≥ [ph − v(l)]J(ph) (9)
[ph − v(h)] J(ph) ≥ [pl − v(h)]J(pl) (10)
These two inequalities represent the Incentive Compatibility Constraints (ICC) for low
and high quality sellers, respectively. Any SE in which quality q ∈ {l, h} is traded
must also: 1) satisfy the participation constraint of sellers (pq ≥ v(q)) and buyers
(pq ≤ u(q)); 2) ensure that if buyers obtain higher surplus from buying at pq than at
pq′ , then J(pq) = 1. These conditions imply that any SE is characterized by ph > pl
and J(ph) < J(pl).
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Whenever the equilibrium is separating, the robustness condition (8) can be rewrit-
ten as
[pl − v(l)] J(pl)
p− v(l) ≤
[ph − v(h)] J(ph)
p− v(h) (13)
If (13) is violated for some p that is potentially appealing to type h, then σ(l|p) = 0.
The next lemma illustrates how D1 helps to restrict the set of separating equilibria.
Lemma 2. In any D1-robust SE of type I, the ICC of low quality sellers is satisfied
with equality unless ph = v(h).
Proof. See appendix.
In any SE of type I the probability to sell at ph must be less than 1; otherwise,
low quality sellers would mimic. Therefore, a high quality seller who is announcing ph
would be willing to deviate and announce a price p slightly lower than ph whenever
13If J(ph) ≥ J(pl), then, from type l ICC, ph < pl. Type l ICC can be rewritten as
pl − v(l)




But then, given ph < pl and v(h) > v(l),
pl − v(h)
ph − v(h) >
pl − v(l)




so that type h ICC is violated. By converse, if J(ph) < J(pl), then ph > pl follows from R5(ii).
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the gains from the increase in the probability to sell outweigh the loss due to the small
reduction in the price. If the ICC of type l does not hold with equality, low quality
sellers strictly prefer pl to ph. Therefore, they are not willing to deviate unless the
chances to sell at p become relatively high. Buyers accordingly infer that the deviation
p must come from a high quality seller, which in turn gives sellers the incentive to
deviate. By contrast, when type l ICC holds with equality, low quality sellers are
indifferent between pl and ph. Therefore, they are willing to deviate whenever the high
quality are, which implies that buyers’ off-equilibrium beliefs cannot be restricted.14
We are interested in market conditions under which a SE of type I is robust to D1.
A key parameter in our discussion is the ratio, θ, between potential demand, given by
the number of buyers, and potential supply, given by the number of sellers. This is a
measure of the competitive pressure faced by buyers and sellers.
The next illustrates under what conditions separating equilibria of type I may
emerge.
Lemma 3. If 1− λ ≥ θ there is no SE of type I. If 1− λ < θ D1-robust SE must be
of type I.
Proof. See appendix.
Consider a SE of type I: sellers of type l announce pl and sellers of type h announce
ph ≥ v(h). If 1 − λ exceeds θ, low quality sellers are relatively more numerous than
buyers (i.e. they are the long side of the market). Sellers compete to sell, while
buyers face no competitive pressure. Accordingly, competition among low quality
sellers implies that, in equilibrium, pl = v(l).
15 However, if pl = v(l), the ICC of type
l sellers can never be satisfied for any ph ≥ v(h) unless the probability to trade at ph
were equal to zero, which would contradict the hypothesis of a type I SE.
Consider now the case 1 − λ < θ. Low quality sellers are on the short side of
the market. Buyers, on the other hand, face competitive pressure. If prices are such
that buyers are making a positive surplus, then all buyers should be willing to buy.
However, if 1− λ < θ, low quality sellers are not enough to satisfy the whole demand.
14Interestingly, type l sellers’ ICC needs to be binding for a second best (see Muthoo and Mu-
tuswami 2005).
15Price competition works here because the worst belief that buyers can assign to a seller announcing
a price lower than pl is that he is of type l with probability 1, and buyers are buying quality l at pl.
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Therefore, they will raise their prices until some of the buyers will be willing to buy
(from high quality sellers) at a price ph ≥ v(h). If, on the other hand, buyers obtain
zero surplus, then ph > v(h). Lemma 2 thus ensures that the high quality is traded.
Yet, the probability to sell at ph must be sufficiently low to ensure that low quality
sellers do not have incentive to announce ph.
We now turn to the full characterization of robust type I equilibria. Define
δ ≡ GFTl




where, for one unit of quality q, GFTq ≡ u(q) − v(q) measures the gains from trade,
and ∆GFT = GFTl−GFTh. Note that δ represents the overall gains from trading the
low quality scaled by the range of feasible prices u(h)− v(l), while γ is the difference
in the gains from trade between the two qualities, ∆GFT , over the difference in the
seller’s evaluation of the two qualities v(h) − v(l). When γ > (<)0, the gains from
trading the low quality are higher (lower) than those from trading the high quality.
Let θˆ ≡ 1 − λ + δλ, and θγ ≡ 1 − λ + γλI{γ>0} where I{γ>0} : R → {0, 1} is an
indicator function that takes value 1 if γ > 0 and zero otherwise. Note that since
γ < δ holds, θˆ is always strictly greater than θγ.
Proposition 1. D1-robust equilibria of type I emerge if and only if 1− λ < θ. In all






, ii) pl and ph are uniquely
determined:
i. ph = u(h), pl = u(l), if θ ∈ [θˆ,∞);
ii. ph = v(l) +
λ[u(h)−u(l)]
1−θ , pl = v(l) +
θ−(1−λ)[u(h)−u(l)]
1−θ if θ ∈ (θγ, θˆ);
iii. ph = v(h), pl = u(l)− [u(h)− v(h)] if θ ∈ (1− λ, θγ].
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium outcome in terms of prices and traded
quantities and qualities is uniquely determined and crucially depends on the buyers
to sellers ratio, θ. If θ is very large, i.e. greater than θˆ, trade (of both qualities)
occurs at buyers’ reservation prices, u(h) and u(l) (case i). If θ is only moderately
large, i.e. greater than 1 − λ but lower than θˆ, trade (of both qualities) occurs at
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prices that guarantee a positive surplus to the buyers (cases ii and iii). Notice that,
provided that γ ≤ 0, ph will exceed type h sellers’ reservation prices in any robust SE
of type I. This occurs even though the probability to sell at ph, J(ph), is always less
than one, which would suggest that high quality sellers’ profits should be competed
away. This is a standard effect of asymmetric information. Price competition among
high types is impaired by buyers’ fear that low types may deviate and announce ph
if the probability to sell at ph becomes too large. Hence, price competition among
sellers of type h comes to a halt when the demand at ph is such that low quality sellers
are indifferent between announcing ph and announcing pl. Limited price competition
causes high quality sellers’ profits to remain positive, even if J(ph) < 1.
Things change substantially if the gains from trading the low quality exceed those
from trading the high quality (γ > 0) and θ ≤ θγ (if θ > θγ the previous discussion
applies). In this case, the ICC of low quality sellers does not hold with equality and
the price announced by high quality sellers drops to v(h). In other words, high quality
sellers must forgo their profits in order to trade. Low quality sellers will then announce
the highest possible price at which buyers (weakly) prefer to buy the low quality, given
the option to buy the high quality at v(h). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between
θ and the equilibrium prices.
3.3 Type II equilibria: Only the low quality is traded
In this section we turn our attention to the typical lemon-market situation in which
the high quality is driven out of the market (type II equilibria). We will characterize
the (unique) robust outcome of type II equilibria and show that such equilibria arise
if and only if no robust type I equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2. D1-robust equilibria of type II emerge if and only if 1− λ ≥ θ. In all
these equilibria, the fraction of quality l traded is θ/(1− λ) ≤ 1. All trade occurs at a
unique price p∗, which is equal to v(l) if 1− λ > θ.16
Proof. See appendix.
In order to gather intuitions on proposition 2, notice that when 1 − λ > θ, (low
quality) sellers face competitive pressure. They compete to sell their goods, which
16The analysis of the equilibrium price for the special case 1 − λ = θ is presented in the proof.
There, it is shown that a discontinuity arises when γ > 0.
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drives their profits to zero (p∗ = v(l)). If, on the other hand, 1 − λ < θ, sellers of
low quality are on the short side and buyers face competitive pressure. Thus, low
quality sellers would announce p∗ = u(l). At this price, they would extract all the
surplus from the buyers and make strictly positive profits. It is easy to see why these
equilibria fail D1. Whenever sellers of low quality make strictly positive profits, their
opportunity cost of deviating, measured by pi∗(l), is larger than that of high quality
sellers – which equals zero since they are not trading. Accordingly, while high quality
sellers are never worse off when deviating, low quality sellers might be hurt. It follows
that, upon observing a deviation p > v(h), buyers should infer that the seller deviating
is of high quality.
By contrast, given a type II equilibrium, low quality sellers make zero profits when
they are the long side of the market. Hence, the opportunity cost of deviating is the
same for low and high quality sellers, and both types of sellers are never worse off
if deviating. Thus, deviating to prices at which no trade occurs in equilibrium is as
cheap a way to signal quality for the low type as it is for the high type. Unsurprisingly,
deviations to higher prices thus fail to signal higher quality and the equilibrium is
robust.
Finally, notice that robust type II equilibria can be either SE or hybrid equilibria
(HE). In SE all low quality sellers announce p∗ while high quality sellers announce p.
In HE, all sellers of quality h and a fraction smaller than 1−λ−θ of low quality sellers
announce p (and do not trade) while the rest announce p∗.17
4 Properties of the robust equilibrium outcome
We now discuss the properties of the equilibrium outcome and characterize the amounts
of low and high quality goods traded and the distribution of surplus.
Cho and Sobel (1990) show that in signaling games that satisfy specific monotonic-
ity and sorting conditions, D1 selects a unique equilibrium, which is a SE. In the model
17One might wonder whether D1 is necessary for the result that the high quality is traded whenever
1−λ < θ. We considered robustness of type II equilibria to less powerful refinements such as Divinity
(Banks and Sobel, 1987) and Sequential Perfection (Grossman and Perry, 1986). Both criteria give
the same results. There is only a significant difference between these criteria and D1: when 1−λ < θ,
type II equilibria may pass Divinity and Sequential Perfection (but not D1) if the proportion of high
quality sellers is sufficiently small.
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we analyze, given any two prices p and p′ < p and associated probabilities to sell J(p)
and J(p′) their sorting condition would be
J(p)[p− v(l)] ≥ J(p′)[p′ − v(l)]⇒ J(p)[p− v(h)] > J(p′)[p′ − v(h)] (16)
Whenever low quality sellers benefit from announcing a higher price, high quality
sellers would strictly benefit from doing the same. Condition (16) is of course satisfied
for all prices at which trade occurs, i.e. provided that J(p) > 0 and J(p′) > 0.
However, at prices at which the probability to sell is zero the net payoff is independent
of the announced price and seller’s type. Hence, at such prices, no sorting is possible
and (16) is not satisfied. These observations help explaining why in the model we
analyze the set of D1 robust equilibria does not include only separating equilibria and
generally contains more than one equilibrium. Nevertheless, as it directly follows from
the combination of proposition 2 and lemmata 1 and 3, D1 guarantees separation at
prices at which trade occurs. Pooling can only occur at prices at which trade does
not occur.18 As a result, the equilibrium outcome is essentially unique in terms of
quantities and prices at which trade occurs.
Proposition 3. Given the values of λ, θ 6= 1 − λ, u(l), v(l), u(h), v(h), all the
resulting D1-robust equilibria yield the same unique outcome in terms of prices of
traded goods, quality and quantity of trade. In particular: i. The fraction of quality
l goods being traded (over the total supply of quality l) is f(l) = min[θ/(1 − λ), 1];











Because of this uniqueness property, the model implies a very precise relationship
between the market conditions (as measured by θ) and:
a. Quantity and quality of trade;
b. Distribution of trade surplus;
c. Price dispersion and distortions;
18In particular, pooling survives D1 in equilibria of type II where only a fraction of low quality
sellers announce p∗ = v(l) at which trade occurs, while high quality sellers and the rest of low quality
sellers who decide not to trade announce p. However, such HE yield the same equilibrium outcome
in terms of quantities and qualities traded and agents’ interim payoffs as the robust SE of type II in
which all sellers of type l announce p∗.
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d. Signaling role of prices.
a. Quantity and quality of trade.
If low quality sellers are relatively more numerous than buyers, the only D1-robust
equilibrium is one in which only the low quality is traded; all buyers are able to buy.
By converse, if buyers are relatively more numerous than low quality sellers, in the
robust equilibrium both low quality and high quality sellers are able to sell their goods
with positive probability. All low quality sellers are able to sell while only a fraction
of sellers of high quality is able to find a buyer.
The fraction of high quality goods traded is a nondecreasing function of θ, as
illustrated in Figure 2. For values of θ ≤ 1 − λ, the fraction of high quality traded,
f(h), is equal to zero, while the fraction of low quality, f(l), increases in θ. If θ > 1−λ,
f(h) linearly increases in θ until it reaches the value δ < 1 where θ equals the critical
value θˆ; f(l) stays constant. Once θ has reached θˆ, further increases in θ do not affect
f(h) any longer. Notice that, while all buyers are able to buy one good if θ ≤ θˆ, a
fraction λδ of buyers do not obtain any good when the reverse (strict) inequality holds.
This happens in spite of the fact that high quality sellers sell with probability δ < 1.
Although trade would be mutually beneficial, there might be buyers and sellers who
are unable to trade. On the other hand, D1 selects the equilibrium where the amount
of trade is maximized among all SE. Hence, the prevailing SE is the one in which the
potential inefficiency related to the quantity of trade is minimized.
It is important to note that δ is decreasing in u(h). When demand is sufficiently
high, the higher is u(h) the higher must be the price of high quality goods. However,
the probability to sell a high quality good is bounded above by δ. As a result, the
more buyers value high quality goods, the lower must be the maximum fraction of
high quality sellers able to sell their good. The model thus displays a sort of curse on
high quality sellers.
b. Distribution of trade surplus
The strength of competition among sellers has important redistributive implica-
tions. On the one hand, when competition is weak, the average quality traded is
higher. On the other hand, sellers appropriate a larger share of the surplus. Our
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results show that, provided that there are potential gains from trading the low quality
(v(l) < u(l)), buyers unambiguously benefit from strong competition. To see this,
notice that if 1−λ exceeds θ the low quality is traded at p = v(l). On the other hand,
if θ exceeds 1 − λ, the low quality is always traded at a price higher than v(l). In
equilibrium, the surplus obtained from buying either quality is the same. Hence, buy-
ers’ surplus is always lower under weak competition than under strong competition.
In other words, all the potential benefits from trading the high quality accrue to the
sellers.
c. Price dispersion and distortions
Prices of traded goods are non decreasing functions of θ as described in figure 1.
When 1 − λ > θ, all trade occurs at price pl (no price dispersion). Under reversed
market conditions (1 − λ < θ), trade occurs at two different prices, pl and ph (price
dispersion).
Wilson (1980) first argued that, in a market for lemons with price setting sellers,
trade may occur at a distribution of prices rather than at a unique price. The results
of our analysis have precise implications regarding the conditions under which a distri-
bution of prices should arise in a lemon market. According to our model, the stronger
the competition, the less price dispersion and variety of trade we should observe, and
viceversa. This implication holds not just in the case of a market with two types of
sellers and two qualities of goods, but also in the general case of any finite number N
of qualities, which is analyzed in the appendix.
As in other models with adverse selection, signaling through prices might result
in price distortions. Notably, the magnitude of such distortionary effects varies with
market conditions. In particular, price distortion vanishes for sufficiently weak com-
petition (θ > θˆ), while it is extreme in the case of strong competition, where the high
quality price is so high that no trade is possible.
d. Signaling role of prices
Off the equilibrium path, the information content of a deviation to a price higher
than the equilibrium price changes according to whether sellers face weak competition
or strong competition. If competition among sellers is weak, starting from an equi-
librium in which only the low quality is traded, a deviation to a higher price allows
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high quality sellers to reveal themselves. As a consequence, the initial equilibrium
unravels. By converse, in case of strong competition among sellers, both high and low
quality sellers make zero profits and therefore have identical incentives to deviate. As
a result, the deviation does not serve as a signal for high quality sellers and the initial
equilibrium holds.
In equilibria that are robust to D1, the effectiveness of the price system at reflecting
information along the equilibrium path also depends on the strength of competition
among sellers. As we have shown, when competition is weak, both qualities are traded
and each quality is traded at a different price. That is, prices are fully informative
and enable high quality sellers to trade. However, when competition is strong, only
low quality sellers are able to trade. The price system associated with this equilibrium
is still fully informative, but the only credible way for high quality sellers to reveal
their type is to decide not to trade (i.e. to announce a price at which trade does not
take place). In other words, when competition is strong, there is no equilibrium price
system that is both informative and would allow high quality goods to be traded.
These observations lead us to the the following conclusion. In lemon markets,
whenever competition among sellers is strong, the traditional role of prices as a device
for competing against rival sellers impairs the effectiveness of prices as a device for
conveying information to the buyers.
4.1 Policy implications: price controls
We have shown that, when 1 − λ > θ, strong competition among sellers inhibits the
signaling role of prices and drives high quality sellers out of the market. The resulting
equilibrium outcome is inefficient whenever gains from trading quality h exceed those
from trading quality l, i.e. GFTh > GFTl. We now show that the introduction of a
price-floor – which forces sellers to set prices above a minimum price p – could help to
restore trade of the high quality in these circumstances. Intuitively, the introduction
of a price floor leaves positive profits to low quality sellers, thus making separation
possible by reducing the incentive to mimic.
It is immediate to verify that Lemma 1 still applies, so that pooling/hybrid equi-
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libria in which trade occurs at p ≥ p are not robust to D1.19 Therefore, we restrict
attention to SE.
Assume that the price-floor p is set to satisfy v(l) < p < u(l). In a SE, low
quality sellers are able to trade only if pl ∈ [p, u(l)]. Given 1 − λ > θ, there is
always excess supply at pl. Hence, price competition will drive the price of the low
quality down to the price floor: pl = p. In contrast with the previous analysis,
however, low quality sellers now make positive expected profits at pl = p. According
to D1, if the high quality is not traded, any deviation to a price above v(h) should
be considered as emanating from a type h seller. It is then clear that, so long as
GFTh > GFTl, the high quality must always be traded with positive probability in
equilibrium. Otherwise, sellers could deviate to prices slightly above v(h) and be able
to attract buyers. Moreover, GFTh > GFTl implies that ph must exceed v(h) in any
separating equilibrium. Otherwise, buyers would not buy at pl. This implies – see




p− v(l)] = J(ph) [ph − v(l)] (17)
Since both qualities are necessarily traded with probability less than one, buyers
must be indifferent between buying the low quality at p and buying the high quality
at ph,
u(h)− ph = u(l)− p (18)
Finally, the requirement that the number of goods bought equals the number of good
sold (i.e. equation 1) implies
λJ(ph) + (1− λ)J(pl) = θ (19)
Solving for ph, J(ph), and J(p) the system formed by equations (17), (18), and (19),
yields the following equilibrium prices and the associated probabilities to trade
19In these equilibria, type l sellers make higher expected profits than type h sellers. Accordingly,
sellers of high quality are more likely to benefit from deviating to a higher price, which undermines
the equilibrium.
25
pl = p; ph = u(h)− u(l) + p (20)
J(p) = θ
p− v(l) + u(h)− u(l)
p− v(l) + (1− λ) [u(h)− u(l)] (21)
J(ph) = θ
p− v(l)
p− v(l) + (1− λ) [u(h)− u(l)] (22)
From (21) and (22), an increase in the price floor p within the interval [v(l), u(l)]
increases the probability to trade quality h and reduces the probability to trade quality
l. When GFTh > GFTl, an increase in the price floor thus increases overall efficiency.
However, notice that (18) implies that any increase in the price floor always reduces
the surplus available to the buyers. As a result, any efficiency gain associated with a
price floor comes at the cost of a lower buyers’ surplus.
The introduction of price controls in the form of a price-floor can thus help to
restore trade of the high quality under strong competition. Having said that, the
price-floor only works if it is neither too low (i.e. lower than v(l)) nor too high (i.e.
higher than u(l)). In the first case, it would simply be ineffective and undercutting by
low quality sellers would drive the high quality out of the market. In the second case,
complete market breakdown would be the only D1-robust equilibrium outcome. The
argument for the second result is similar to the one developed by Adriani and Deidda
(2009). If p > u(l), there is no separating equilibrium with trade. Since all pooling
equilibria with trade fail D1, the unique D1-robust outcome must involve no trade.20
Finally, we note that the presence of a price-floor does not eliminate price-distortions.
As a result, the probability of trading the high quality could be higher if the price con-
trol were to take the form of a fixed price. Forcing both qualities to stick to the same
price would eliminate any scope for price signaling, thus implementing the outcome of
a pooling equilibrium. A pooling price that is compatible with trade exists if21
λ[u(h)− v(h)] + (1− λ)[u(l)− v(h)] ≥ 0 (23)
20If p > u(l) there is always a D1-robust equilibrium with no trade. Intuitively, since both types
make zero profits in equilibrium, D1 does not restrict buyers’ beliefs in the presence of a deviation
to any price above p. As a result, beliefs that assign a sufficiently low probability to type h when
observing an off-equilibrium price do not violate D1 and sustain the no trade equilibrium.
21A pooling price at which trade occurs must be at most equal to the expected quality λu(h) +
(1− λ)u(l) and greater than or equal to the reservation price of type h, v(h).
26
If trade occurs at the fixed price, the probability to trade the high quality is equal to
θ, which is strictly greater than J(ph) as given by equation (22). Hence, if the fraction
of high quality is sufficiently large or the gains from trading quality h are particularly
large – so that (23) is satisfied – policy interventions aiming at maximizing efficiency
should take the form of a fixed price. Otherwise, a price floor, which allows for
separation, would be more effective.
Taken altogether, our results suggest that limiting the sellers’ ability to choose
their prices might be beneficial. This is broadly consistent with recent evidence by
Huck et al. (2007). Although the problem that subjects face in their experiment is
slightly different from the one considered here, the main effect at work is essentially
the same.22 Limiting the scope for Bertrand competition boosts trade of high quality
goods.
An interesting question is why posted prices are so widespread, even though this
price convention does not always attain the second best. While we believe that this
issue deserves further scrutiny, Bester (1993) suggests a possible answer. A posted price
convention tends to endogenously emerge in markets with asymmetric information, as
opposed to bargaining for instance, when the search costs faced by the buyers become
small.
5 Robustness and extensions
In the appendix, we extend the model to the case of an arbitrary number of qualities.
Here, we focus on the information structure, by considering the possibility that buyers
may have access to other sources of information in addition to the prices.
More specifically, we assume that buyers observe a noisy signal about the quality.
With minor changes to the analysis carried forward in the previous sections, it is
possible to show that this would not change the nature of the problem. Suppose that
each buyer b = 1, ..., B observes a private noisy signal xsb about seller s’s quality after
observing the seller’s price but before choosing whether to buy.23 Conditional on a
22In Huck et al. (2007), sellers choose ex-post the quality to be delivered.
23To keep things simple, we also assume that a buyer’s decision to buy or not is not observable by
other buyers.
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given seller s’s quality, the signals about seller s (xs1, ..., x
s
B) are independently drawn
from the same distribution. To simplify the discussion, we assume that xsb can only
take two values; xsb ∈ {L,H}. This is however not necessary for the point we want
to make. The crucial assumption is that the conditional distribution of x has the
same support independently of whether the seller’s type is h or l – so that there is
no realization of xsb that perfectly reveals the seller’s quality. We denote with ρh the
probability to observe a high signal (xsb = H) when the seller is of type h and with ρl
the same probability when the seller is of type l. We also assume 1 > ρh > ρl > 0,
so that a buyer is more likely to observe H when the seller is of type h than when
the seller is of type l. Since we are adding a further stage to the game – the stage
in which buyers observe their signals – we need to distinguish between buyer’s beliefs
after observing the price (but not the signal) and beliefs after observing both price
and signal. We refer to the first as “price-induced beliefs” and to the second simply
as posterior beliefs.24
The crucial difference with the previous analysis is that, if the signal is informative,
the probability to sell at a given price could now depend on the seller’s type. Intuitively,
given ρh > ρl, each buyer is more likely to observe H when the seller is of type h than
when he is of type l. As a result, when deviating to an off-equilibrium price p, the
probability to sell at p for a type h cannot be lower (and is possibly higher) than the
same probability for a type l, independently of the beliefs induced by the deviation
p.25 In other words, denoting with J(p, q) the probability to sell at price p for a type
q, in the previous sections we had J(p, h) = J(p, l) for all p. If we are to maintain full
generality with regard to the market structure, we can now only impose the weaker
restriction J(p, h) ≥ J(p, l) for all p. The problem analyzed in the previous sections
24Formally, denoting the price-induced beliefs with σ(q|p) as in the previous sections, the posterior
beliefs are now
Pr(q|p, x = H) = σ(q|p)ρq
σ(q|p)ρq + σ(q′|p)ρq′ , Pr(q|p, x = L) =
σ(q|p)(1− ρq)
σ(q|p)(1− ρq) + σ(q′|p)(1− ρq′) (24)
for q, q′ ∈ {l, h}, q 6= q′.
25More precisely, for any price-induced beliefs, the expected quality for a buyer observing H is
(weakly) higher than the expected quality for a buyer observing L. Hence, a buyer who finds it
optimal to buy at a price p when observing L must necessarily find it optimal to buy when observing
H. Since the probability that a buyer observes H is larger when the seller is of type h, the probability
to sell at any price for a type h seller cannot be larger than the same probability for a type l.
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is thus a special case of the problem we analyze here.
Nevertheless, it is still easy to establish that, when 1 − λ > θ, there exists a
D1-robust equilibrium in which only the low quality is traded. All types make zero
profits in this equilibrium (i.e. the unique price at which trade occurs is equal to
v(l)). If a seller announces an off-equilibrium price, the price-induced beliefs cannot
be determined by Bayes rule. It is however easy to find price-induced off-equilibrium
beliefs that sustain the equilibrium. If these assign a sufficiently high probability to
the seller being of type l, buyers will choose not to buy at the off-equilibrium price
independently of the signal realization. As a result, sellers have no incentive to deviate
from the candidate equilibrium.
These out of equilibrium beliefs are robust to D1. Type l would deviate to any
p ≥ v(h) so long as the probability to sell at p were positive. If the signal is not
perfectly informative, the probability to sell at p for a type l is positive whenever the
same probability is positive for a type h (although the probability to sell for a type h
might be larger). Intuitively, even if a buyer’s strategy prescribes buying at the out of
equilibrium price only when observingH, there is always a chance of observingH when
the seller’s type is l. As a result, if type h expects to sell at p with positive probability,
type l expects the same. A type l would thus deviate to any price at which the high
quality can be traded whenever a type h would want to deviate. Hence, beliefs that
assign a sufficiently high probability to type l are robust to D1.
By the same token, we argue that the high quality is traded with positive prob-
ability in any D1-robust equilibrium if 1 − λ < θ. Suppose that the high quality is
not traded. In this case, the equilibrium necessarily involves type l making strictly
positive profits, leaving no surplus to the buyers. Consider then a deviation to a price
p > v(h). A type h would strictly benefit from deviating to p whenever the probability
to sell at p is positive. By converse, a type l would deviate to p only if the probability
to sell were sufficiently high. As already argued, the probability to sell at p for a type
h cannot be lower than the probability to sell for a type l. Hence, a type h would
strictly benefit whenever a type l weakly benefits from the deviation. It follows that
no equilibrium in which the high quality is driven out of the market would survive D1.
To summarize, when competition is strong, there is still a D1-robust equilibrium
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in which only the low quality is traded. When competition is weak, the high quality
is necessarily traded in any D1-robust equilibrium. This illustrates that the effect of
competition we described in the previous sections is unaffected by the introduction of
noisy signals. However, if we want to conclude that competition necessarily drives the
high quality out of the market, we need to rule out equilibria in which the high quality
is traded when competition in strong. This basically reduces to ruling out pooling
and hybrid equilibria with trade. Unfortunately, ruling out pooling equilibria would
require adding more structure to the model, i.e. explicitly modelling how buyers and
sellers are matched. Rather than following this route and assume an explicit market
structure, we turn the problem on its head and show that there are intuitive restrictions
on the probability to sell that are sufficient to rule out pooling equilibria under D1.
These boil down to a weak monotonicity condition for the ratio J(p, h)/J(p, l). The
following lemma extends Lemma 1.
Lemma 4. If J(p, h)/J(p, l) is non-decreasing in p, then no pooling/hybrid equilibrium
survives D1.
Proof. See appendix.
Intuitively, the requirement that J(p, h)/J(p, l) is non-decreasing is equivalent to
saying that buyers’ information matters (weakly) more when the price is high than
when the price is low.
In summary, under a monotonicity condition for the ratio J(p, h)/J(p, l), strong
competition always drives the high quality out of the market. The previous analysis
can be extended without further complications to the case in which the signal is public,
so that, for any seller s, all buyers observe the same (noisy) realization of xs. This
may be relevant for e-commerce applications, since many web sites list measures of
the seller’s quality (e.g. ratings) in addition to the sellers’ prices.
6 Conclusions
This paper tackled the issue of strategic pricing in a competitive market for lemons
where the potential gains from trade are always positive. Sellers’ pricing decisions are
affected by two types of considerations. On the one hand, sellers want to maximize
the chance to find a buyer. On the other hand, they may want to use prices to
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conceal/reveal their true quality. Thus, in markets for lemons, pricing decisions retain
a double function. Sellers may lower prices to undercut competitors or increase them
to signal high quality. We argue that these two roles of prices may be at odds with
each other. When competition among sellers is strong, the use of prices to compete
with other sellers prevails. Announcing a price that is higher than the price at which
trade occurs in the market does not help to be recognized as a high quality seller by
the buyers. The reason is that profits of all sellers are driven to zero by competition.
Hence, all sellers, irrespectively of their quality, have no opportunity cost of deviating
and announcing a higher price.
By contrast, when competition is weak, announcing a price higher than the lowest
price at which trade occurs conveys relevant information to the buyers. The rationale
is that in this case at least some of the sellers make positive profits. Thus, announcing
a higher price (which harms the seller by reducing the likelihood of making a sale) is
relatively more costly for low quality sellers.
The model generates various predictions, some of which are empirically relevant.
First, the degree of price dispersion is inversely related to the degree of competition
among sellers, as measured by the sellers to buyers ratio. We should observe con-
centration of trade around few low prices when competition is strong, whereas trade
should spread upon a distribution of relatively dispersed prices when competition is
weak. Second, the average quality traded in the market should increase (although in a
nonlinear fashion) as competition decreases. This is because weak competition allows
high quality sellers (who would be driven out of the market in the presence of fierce
competition) to sell their goods.
Finally, the paper suggests that, in some circumstances, imposing some degree of
price control might increase efficiency by restoring a positive amount of trade of the





Proof of lemma 1
We first consider pooling equilibria (PE), then Hybrid Equilibria (HE). In any PE of
type I there is a single equilibrium price p∗ at which both high and low qualities are
traded. Hence, all sellers have the same probability to sell, J(p∗). Equilibrium profits
are pi∗s(q) = J(p
∗)[p∗− v(q)], with q ∈ {l, h}. The payoff of a buyer obtaining the good
at p∗ is λ[u(h)− p∗] + (1− λ)[u(l)− p∗]. Since buyers’ payoff must be non-negative a
necessary condition for a PE is p∗ ≤ λu(h) + (1− λ)u(l).




p− v(h) ⇒ v(h)(p− p
∗) ≤ v(l)(p− p∗) (A.1)
We note that p∗ must always be strictly lower than u(h), otherwise buyers would
make a loss. Condition (A.1) is never verified for p > p∗ so that, for deviations above
the pooling equilibrium price, beliefs are such that the seller who deviated is of high
quality. From R5 (ii), if
u(h)− p > λ[u(h)− p∗] + (1− λ)[u(l)− p∗] (A.2)
then J(p) = 1. The above inequality is satisfied for all p lower than p∗ + η, where:
η ≡ (1− λ)[u(h)− u(l)] > 0. (A.3)
Hence, a seller deviating to p ∈ (p∗, p∗ + η) would be able to sell with probability
one at a higher price. The candidate equilibrium thus fails D1.
The same argument given for pooling equilibria applies to hybrid equilibria (HE).
In any HE, there is always a type q ∈ {l, h} who announces at least two different
prices with positive probability. This implies that, given a seller’s type q, the expected
payoff, pi∗(q), must be the same at all prices announced by type q.
By definition, in any HE there is always a price p∗ that is announced by both types
of sellers. Note also that, in a HE of type I, J(p∗) > 0 must hold, since a necessary
condition for quality h to be traded is that type l sellers make positive profits. Since
pi∗(q) is the same at all prices announced by type q, in order to asses the robustness, one
can just focus on the incentives to deviate from p∗. Condition (A.1) stays unchanged.
From R5 (ii), if
u(h)− p > σ(h|p∗)[u(h)− p∗] + (1− σ(h|p∗))[u(l)− p∗] (A.4)
then J(p) = 1. Since pooling occurs at p∗, σ(h|p∗) must be strictly lower than one.
But then, any p ∈ (p∗, p∗ + η˜), with
η˜ ≡ (1− σ(h|p∗))[u(h)− u(l)] > 0 (A.5)
would cause the equilibrium to unravel. 
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Proof of lemma 2
Consider a deviation p > v(h). Rewrite condition (13) as:
p[J(pl)[pl − v(l)]− J(ph)[ph − v(h)]] ≤
v(h)J(pl)[pl − v(l)]− v(l)J(ph)[ph − v(h)] (A.6)
and the ICC of low quality sellers as
J(pl)[pl − v(l)] = J(ph)[ph − v(l)] + ξ (A.7)
where ξ ≥ 0. In any type I equilibrium, 0 < J(ph) < 1 (J(ph) < 1 follows from
J(ph) < J(pl)). If (A.6) were violated for p slightly lower than ph, a seller could profit
from deviating to p. Given p < ph, condition R5 (ii) would imply J(p) = 1 which,
for p sufficiently close to ph, would induce sellers to deviate. Hence, we need to check
that (A.6) holds for prices slightly lower than ph. From low quality sellers ICC, the
LHS of (A.6) is nondecreasing in p. Thus, it is sufficient to check whether (A.6) holds
for p = ph:
ph[J(pl)[pl − v(l)]− J(ph)[ph − v(h)]] ≤
v(h)J(pl)[pl − v(l)]− v(l)J(ph)[ph − v(h)] (A.8)
Inspection of (A.8) and (A.7) shows that ξ = 0 unless ph = v(h). 
Proof of lemma 3
Assume 1 − λ ≥ θ and consider a SE of type I, i.e. both J(ph) and J(pl) are greater
than zero. If 1 − λ ≥ θ there is at least a low quality seller for every buyer. Hence,
J(ph) > 0 implies J(pl) < 1 (see equation 1). However, from condition R5 (ii), if
pl > v(l), low quality sellers could sell with probability one by deviating to a slightly
lower price. Hence, pl = v(l). The ICC of type l sellers then implies J(ph) = 0, i.e.
the high quality is never traded in equilibrium, so there is no SE of type I.
Let us now consider the case 1 − λ < θ. From condition R5 (ii), it is clear that,
if J(pl) < 1, then pl = v(l). However, from type l ICC, this would imply J(ph) = 0.
From equation (1) and 1− λ < θ, it follows that K < 1. But then, condition R5 (iii)
ensures that it is possible to sell with probability one at pl. Hence, J(pl) must be one.
We first show that in any robust SE with pq < u(q) ∀q ∈ {h, l}, J(ph) > 0 must hold
[Step 1 ]; i.e. SE with pq < u(q) are of type I. Then, using lemma 2, we prove that
J(ph) > 0 also holds in SE where, for some q ∈ {l, h}, pq = u(q), i.e. these SE are also
of type I [Step 2 ].
Step 1. Given J(pl) = 1, equation (1) implies
λJ(ph) =
θK − (1− λ)
λ
. (A.9)
Notice that, from R5 (iii), pl < u(l) can only occur if K = 1. (Otherwise type l sellers
would rise the price). Substituting for K = 1 into (A.9) shows that the RHS of (A.9)
is strictly greater than zero for θ > (1− λ).
Step 2. Assume first pl = u(l). Then, if ph > v(h), the ICC of low quality sellers
must hold with equality. But then J(ph) > 0 must be satisfied since J(pl) is positive in
any equilibrium. Condition R5 (ii) then implies that ph equals u(h). (For ph < u(h),
J(ph) would be one and the ICC of type l would be violated.) For analogous reasons,
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ph = v(h) can never be a SE if pl = u(l) as buyers would always prefer ph. Assume now
ph = u(h). If J(ph) were zero, lemma 2 would ensure either pl = v(l) or J(pl) = 0.
Clearly, the second never holds. As for pl = v(l), it is never an equilibrium if low
quality sellers are the short side of the market (1−λ < θ). From (1), J(ph) = 0 would
imply K < 1. From condition R5 (iii), any type l seller could deviate and announce
a price slightly higher than pl and still be able to make a sale with probability one.
Therefore, J(ph) > 0 must hold. 
Proof of proposition 1
Lemmata 1 and 3 imply that 1 − λ < θ is necessary for a robust type I equilibrium.
From lemma 1, robust equilibria of type I are separating. From lemma 3, there is no
SE of type I if 1 − λ ≥ θ. The following characterization of D1-robust equilibria of
type I shows that 1−λ < θ is also sufficient. When 1−λ < θ, the following statements
must be true in any robust SE of type I:
Statement 1. J(pl) is equal to one. This has already been established in the proof
of lemma 2.
Statement 2. pl = u(l) and ph = u(h) hold whenever K < 1. If K < 1 and
pl < u(l), then, from R5 (iii), a type l seller could profit from slightly raising his price.
Given pl = u(l), ph = u(h) follows from R5 (ii).
Statement 3. J(ph) satisfies
J(ph) =
θK − (1− λ)
λ
. (A.10)
The result follows from statement 1 and equation (1).
Statement 4.pl and ph are such that
u(l)− pl ≥ u(h)− ph (A.11)
Otherwise, J(ph) would be one – see R5 (ii) – and type l ICC would be violated.
Endowed with these results, we turn to the particular cases:
Case 1: θ > θˆ. Buyers can make positive surplus only if K = 1 (statement 2 ). Assume
then K = 1. From statement 3,
J(ph) =
θ − (1− λ)
λ
. (A.12)
Using (A.11), and type l sellers ICC one obtains
J(ph) ≤ pl − v(l)
u(h)− v(l)− (u(l)− pl) , (A.13)
which implies J(ph) ≤ δ for pl ≤ u(l). By combining equation (A.12) with J(ph) ≤ δ,
one would obtain θ − (1 − λ) ≤ λδ or θ ≤ θˆ, which would be a contradiction. Thus,
K < 1 and buyers make zero surplus. It follows that pl = u(l) and ph = u(h) must
hold and lemma 2 implies J(ph) = δ.
Case 2: θγ < θ ≤ θˆ. Assume K < 1. Then pq = u(q) ∀q follows from statement 2.
Lemma 2 implies J(ph) = δ. But then statement 3 requires:
θK − λδ ≥ 1− λ (A.14)
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which would contradict θ ≤ θˆ. Therefore, K = 1. We now show that pq = u(q) for
all q is impossible unless θ is exactly equal to θˆ. Consider first the case θ = θˆ. If
K = 1, (A.12) must hold. Substituting θ = θˆ in equation (A.12) yields J(ph) = δ.
Substituting pl from type l ICC into (A.11) – statement 4 – shows that ph ≥ u(h).
Thus, buyers must make zero surplus (pq = u(q)). This in turn requires J(ph) = δ
from lemma 2 and type l ICC.
Consider now the case θ < θˆ. If pq = u(q), then the ICC of type l holding with
equality (lemma 2) implies J(ph) = δ. However, one can use (A.12) to show that this
would contradict θ < θˆ. Thus, pq < u(q), ∀q. Given K = 1, (A.11) must hold with
equality. Otherwise type l sellers could slightly raise their prices and still be able to
sell with probability one (R5 (ii)). If ph > v(h), then prices can be found by replacing
(A.12) into the following equations:
ph =
u(h)− [u(l)− v(l) + v(l)J(ph)]
1− J(ph) (A.15)
pl =
v(l) + J(ph)[u(h)− v(l)− u(l)]
1− J(ph) . (A.16)
These follow from (A.11) and type l ICC both holding with equality (lemma 2). Simple
algebra shows that they do not violate any participation constraint when J(ph) is
given by (A.12) and θγ < θ ≤ θˆ. What remains to show is that ph > v(h) for θ > θγ.
Assume ph = v(h), then, given (A.11) holding with equality, pl = u(l) − GFTh. It is
then immediate to check that type l sellers ICC and (A.12) would imply θ ≤ θγ which
is a contradiction.
Case 3: θ ≤ θγ. The same arguments as in case 2 can be used to claim that
K = 1 and to rule out pq = u(q). The only difference here is that ph = v(h) must
hold. To see this, assume ph > v(h). Equation (A.11) holding with equality implies
pl > u(l)−GFTh. At the same time equation (A.12) and lemma 2 imply that type l
ICC can be written as:
pl = v(l) +
θ − (1− λ)
λ
[v(h)− v(l)] (A.17)
Substituting this expression for pl into pl > u(l)−GFTh and solving for θ yields θ > θγ
which is a contradiction. Therefore, ph = v(h), which implies pl = u(l)− [u(h)−v(h)].
Statement 3 implies that J(ph) is given by (A.12).
To complete the characterization, note that, by construction, the equilibrium out-
come is sustained by robust off-equilibrium beliefs. Therefore, 1 − λ < θ is sufficient
for a D1-robust equilibrium. 
Proof of proposition 2
We start by showing that all trade occurs at a unique price p∗ in all type II equilibria.
Then, we characterize the equilibrium outcomes of all type II equilibria in terms of
the price at which trade occurs and analyze beliefs that support the existence of these
equilibria. Next, we show that equilibria of type II always fail D1 if 1 − λ < θ and
that there is an equilibrium outcome that passes D1 if 1 − λ > θ. The special case
1− λ = θ is then considered. Finally, we characterize the amount of trade.
a. Uniqueness of price. Suppose that trade occurs at more than one price. We
prove the result for the case of two different equilibrium prices p′ and p′′ with p′′ > p′.
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The same argument applies to any number of prices higher than one. Clearly, p′, p′′
could be a pair of equilibrium prices if and only if profits for type l sellers were the
same at the two prices, which would imply that J(p′′) < J(p′). It follows that J(p′′)
must be lower than 1. But then, any seller announcing p′′ would profit from deviating
to p′′− , where  is greater than zero but sufficiently small. From R5(ii), he could sell
with probability one at p′′−  since off-equilibrium beliefs cannot assign him a quality
lower than l. Therefore, the only possible equilibrium outcome implies a single price
p∗.
b. Equilibrium price. Notice first that in every type II equilibrium p∗ necessarily
lies in the interval [v(l), u(l)]. If (1− λ) > θ, sellers of type l are the long side of the
market, and J(p∗) = θK/(1 − λ) < 1. In this case, no price p∗ greater than v(l) can
emerge in equilibrium. If p∗ > v(l) sellers would profit from slightly reducing their
price and sell with probability one (R5(ii)). As a result, p∗ = v(l) must hold. Clearly,
type h sellers must announce a price such that buyers prefer p∗.
Consider now the case (1 − λ) < θ. We start by showing that p∗ = u(l) and
J(p∗) = 1. If p∗ < u(l), buyers make positive surplus and, therefore, are all willing to
buy at p∗. Given 1− λ < θ, K must be less than one. But then (R5(iii)) implies that
type l sellers could announce a slightly higher price and be able to sell with probability
one. Hence, p∗ = u(l). At this price, type l sellers must have no incentive to cut their
prices. Hence, J(p∗) = 1 must hold. Again, from R5(ii), type h sellers must announce
a price ph ≥ u(h).
Finally, in both cases, there must be off-equilibrium beliefs such that no one has
any incentive to deviate. It is easy to verify that these beliefs exist. For instance,
beliefs assigning σ(h|p) = 0 to any seller announcing an off-equilibrium price p sustain
the equilibrium. The next step shows that beliefs which sustain equilibria of type II
are robust if and only if 1− λ ≥ θ.
c. Robustness. It is immediate to show that type II equilibria satisfy D1 when
1 − λ > θ. Both the RHS and the LHS of (8) are zero for all p. By contrast, type
II equilibria where 1− λ < θ always fail D1. In equilibrium, low quality sellers make
profits pi∗(l) = u(l) − v(l) while high quality sellers make zero profits. Condition (8)
becomes, for any p > v(h):
u(l)− v(l)
p− v(l) ≤ 0, (A.18)
which does not hold for any p > v(h) > v(l). Since buyers make zero surplus, J(p) = 1
for all p > v(h) such that u(h) − p > 0. Hence, any deviation p ∈ (v(h), u(h)) would
destabilize the candidate equilibrium.
d. Case 1 − λ = θ. Notice that also in this case the equilibrium is characterized
by a unique price p∗ ∈ [v(l), u(l)]. For a deviation p > v(h), condition (8) becomes
p∗ − v(l)
p− v(l) ≤ 0. (A.19)
From R5(ii), J(p) = 1 for all p such that
u(h)− p > u(l)− p∗. (A.20)
In this special case, it is necessary to distinguish between γ ≤ 0 and γ > 0, as in
proposition 1. Consider first the case γ ≤ 0 (which implies u(l)− v(l) ≤ u(h)− v(h)).
The only D1 robust equilibrium of type II is such that p∗ = v(l). To show this,
notice that condition (A.19) is violated whenever p∗ > v(l). Given γ ≤ 0, for any
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p∗ > v(l) it is possible to find a deviation p > v(h) such that (A.20) is satisfied.
Hence, p∗ = v(l) is the only possible equilibrium price. Consider now the case γ > 0.
Condition (A.19) is still violated whenever p∗ > v(l). However, whether there is any
p > v(h) such that (A.20) holds now depends on p∗. A deviation p > v(h) such that
(A.20) holds is possible only if p∗ > u(l) − [u(h) − v(h)]. Hence, robustness to D1
requires p∗ ≤ u(l)− [u(h)− v(h)]. In principle, any p∗ ∈ [v(l), u(l)− [u(h)− v(h)] can
be an equilibrium price when γ > 0. The reason why D1 does not permit to select a
price in this case is that, when γ > 0, a discontinuity arises at θ = 1− λ. To see this,
consider the limit of a robust type I equilibrium for θ → 1−λ. When γ > 0, the right
limit of the expression for pl given in proposition 1 selects p
∗ = u(l)− [u(h)−v(h)]. On
the other hand, the left limit for θ → 1−λ of the price of a type II robust equilibrium
selects p∗ = v(l).
e. Fraction of quality l traded. It is immediate to check that K = 1 whenever
1−λ ≥ θ. Therefore, each buyer is able to obtain a unit of a quality l good. It follows
that the fraction of quality l goods traded is θ
1−λ . 
Proof of proposition 3
Case 1. 1 − λ > θ. From Proposition 2, there exist D1-robust equilibria of type
II. In all of these equilibria, the price, p∗, at which trade occurs and the fraction of
quality traded, f(l), are uniquely determined by the model’s exogenous parameters.
Moreover, according to lemma 3 no equilibrium of type I exists. Hence, we conclude
that for 1− λ > θ the equilibrium outcome is unique.
Case 2. 1− λ < θ. From Proposition 2 there is no D1-robust equilibria of type II. On
the other hand, according to proposition 1 there exist D1-robust equilibria of type I.
Again, in all these equilibria, the prices at which trade occurs, pq, and the fractions of
high and low quality traded (f(h) and f(l) respectively) are uniquely determined by
parameters. Thus, the equilibrium outcome is unique.
For completeness, we discuss the special case 1 − λ = θ. The proof of proposition 2
implies that, if γ ≤ 0, the results under case 1 also apply to 1 − λ = θ. If γ > 0, a
discontinuity arises at 1−λ = θ. While traded quantities are still uniquely determined,
the price p∗ experiences a jump from v(l) to u(l)− [u(h)− v(h)]. 
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose that a pooling occurs at price p∗ ≥ v(h) and consider a deviation to a higher
price p′ > p∗. A type l would weakly benefit from deviating to p′ if
J(p′, l)[p′ − v(l)] ≥ J(p∗, l)[p∗ − v(l)] (A.21)
where the LHS of the expression is the expected profit from the deviation and the RHS
is the expected equilibrium payoff for type l. A type h seller would strictly benefit if
J(p′, h)[p′ − v(h)] > J(p∗, h)[p∗ − v(h)] (A.22)
Assume now that, for all price-induced beliefs, J(p, h)/J(p, l) is non-decreasing in p.
Given (A.21), it is immediate to check that
p′ − v(h)
p∗ − v(h) >
p′ − v(l)








where the first inequality comes from p′ > p∗ and v(h) > v(l), the second inequality
comes from (A.21) and the third comes from the monotonicity condition on J(p, h)/J(p, l).
The above result thus implies that (A.22) is satisfied whenever (A.21) is satisfied. In
words, type h strictly benefits from the deviation whenever type l weakly benefits.
According to D1, buyers should then assign probability zero to type l when observing
a deviation to any p′ > p∗. Notice that, so long as the signal x does not allow to
perfectly assess the quality of the good, buyers always attach a strictly positive proba-
bility to type l when the price is p∗. As a result, a deviation to a price slightly above p∗
would produce a discrete jump in the expected quality. From R5 (ii), the probability
to sell at p′ must be one. This implies that sellers have incentive to deviate to higher
prices when there is a pooling or a hybrid equilibrium. Hence, any pooling or hybrid
equilibrium would fail D1. 
Extension to any finite number of qualities
This section generalizes the results concerning the set of equilibria robust to D1 to the
case of a finite number (N+1) of qualities. We show that, as in the case of two qualities,
D1 guarantees separation at all prices at which trade occurs. The comparative statics
for the general case are also consistent with the results obtained in the two qualities
case. When θ is so low that buyers are relatively more numerous than sellers of the
lowest quality, no quality other than the lowest is traded. Increases in the value of θ
allow higher qualities to be traded until, for θ sufficiently large, all qualities are traded.
Qualities are indexed by q = 0, ..., N . Each seller’s quality is drawn from a distri-
bution λ : {0, 1, ..., N} → [0, 1], where λq,
∑N
q=0 λq = 1, denotes the probability associ-
ated with quality q. Buyers’ posterior beliefs are denoted with σ(q|p0s),
∑N
q=0 σ(q|p0s) =
1. We maintain the convention that agents who choose not to trade announce p > u(N)
(sellers) or select p = 0 (buyers).
Let us concentrate first on pooling and hybrid equilibria in which two or more types
of sellers trade at the same price. In order to assess the robustness of these equilibria,
we need to state the equivalent of condition (8). In any of these equilibria there always
exists a price p∗ at which a non-singleton non-empty set of qualities, M ⊆ {0, ..., N},
is traded. Let qM be the highest quality in M . Take any quality q ∈ M, q 6= qM .




p− v(qM) , (A.24)
which, given v(q) < v(qM), is violated for any p > p
∗. Thus, robust beliefs should
assign probability 0 to a deviation p > p∗ by any quality in M except for qM . As for
qualities q /∈M , the following applies. Sellers of qualities q < qM who do not trade at
p∗ make at least the same profits they would make at p∗ by charging a different price
(since they could always announce p∗). Since v(q) < v(qM), they should be assigned
probability zero. Sellers of qualities q > qM should also be assigned probability zero
so long as p < v(qM +1). Thus, deviations p
∗ < p < v(qM +1) are attributed to sellers






which is always true for p close enough to p∗. Thus deviating to a price slightly higher
than p∗ would allow sellers of type qM to reveal their type and induce buyers to buy.
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Therefore, neither pooling nor hybrid equilibria in which two or more types trade at
the same price survive D1.
The set of robust equilibria therefore includes only separating equilibria and hy-
brid equilibria with the necessary condition that each price at which trade occurs is
announced by only one type of seller (i.e. pooling only occurs at p). We now focus on
these equilibria. If θ ≤ λ0, the discussion made in the previous sections leads to the
immediate conclusion that only quality 0 is traded.
By converse, when θ > λ0, sellers of quality 0 make positive profits and, therefore,
higher qualities must be traded. In order to characterize these equilibria, we analyze
the properties of the ICC. We start by showing that when the “adjacent upward” ICC
is satisfied, all the ICC with respect to all higher qualities are satisfied. The relevant
ICC for sellers is:
J(pq−s)[pq−s − v(q − s)] ≥ J(pq)[pq − v(q − s)] (A.26)
for all q and s = 0, ...q. It is immediate to check that J(p0) = 1 holds. This, together
with (A.26) yields J(pq) < J(pq−1) < ... < J(p1) < 1, whenever pq > pq−1 > ... > p0.
From equation (A.26):
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − 1)] ≥ J(pq)[pq − v(q − 1)] (A.27)
and
J(pq)[pq − v(q)] ≥ J(pq+1)[pq+1 − v(q)]. (A.28)
Then, by using v(q) > v(q − 1) and J(pq) > J(pq+1), it follows that
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − 1)] ≥ J(pq+1)[pq+1 − v(q − 1)] (A.29)
always holds. Applying the same reasoning to qualities higher than q + 1 shows that
when the “adjacent upward” ICC are satisfied, all the ICC with respect to all higher
qualities are satisfied.
The next step is to show, by applying D1, that the “adjacent upward” ICC of
a given quality must hold with equality whenever the “adjacent upward” quality is
traded. It is immediate to check that R5 (ii) ensures that buyers’ surplus is constant
across all quantities that are traded,
u(q)− pq = k ∀q = 0, 1, ..., N, (A.30)
where k is a constant.
For q > 0, buyers may only be attracted through deviations p < pq. Hence, we
restrict attention to deviations p < pq. Notice that D1 requires that type q should be





This is the equivalent of condition (8). The next lemma generalizes lemma 2.
Lemma 5. For all q = 1, ..., N , in any robust equilibrium in which quality q is traded,
the “adjacent upward” ICC of sellers of quality q − 1 holds with equality unless pq =
v(q).
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Proof. Consider a deviation p ∈ (v(q), pq). Notice that buyers are willing to buy
at p if they think that the deviation comes from type q, since p < pq. We argue that
whenever it is possible to delete type q − 1 from the deviation it is also possible to
delete all types q − s, s ≥ 2. To show this point, assume that type q − 1 can be
eliminated:
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − 1)]
p− v(q − 1) >
J(pq)[pq − v(q)]
p− v(q) . (A.32)
Consider now type q − s. From the incentive compatibility condition:
J(pq−s)[pq−s − v(q − s)]
p− v(q − s) ≥
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − s)]
p− v(q − s) . (A.33)
But then, for any p > v(q) > pq−1, the following relationship
J(pq−s)[pq−s − v(q − s)]
p− v(q − s) >
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − 1)]
p− v(q − 1) (A.34)
holds, which implies that type q−s can be deleted, whenever type q−1 can be deleted.
Since p < pq < u(q) < v(q+1), sellers of type higher than q are never willing to deviate
to p. This implies that if type q−1 can be deleted, beliefs should be that the deviation
comes from q. As in the two-quality case, we show that whenever pq > v(q), a viable
deviation p ∈ (v(q), pq), for which type q − 1 can be deleted, exists so long as the
incentive compatibility condition of type q − 1 holds with inequality. Suppose then
that the ICC holds with strict inequality. Assume that the deviation consists in a
price p = pq − ,  > 0 which is a small undercutting of price pq. We want to show
that there exists  > 0 such that:
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − 1)]
pq − − v(q − 1) >
J(pq)[pq − v(q)]
pq − − v(q) . (A.35)
Condition (A.35) can be rewritten as:
J(pq−1)[pq−1 − v(q − 1)]
J(pq)[pq − v(q − 1)] >
pq − v(q)
pq − v(q − 1)
pq − − v(q − 1)
pq − − v(q) . (A.36)
For pq > v(q), the LHS (which does not depend on ) is strictly greater than 1 whenever
the ICC of type q−1 holds with strict inequality. On the other hand, the RHS goes to
1 as  becomes small. Thus, there always exists  such that type q − 1 can be deleted
unless either the ICC holds with equality or pq = v(q). In fact, in the case pq = v(q),
undercutting is never profitable for type q. Hence, either the ICC holds with equality
or pq = v(q). 
We are now ready to characterize the robust equilibria. We distinguish between
the case in which all qualities are traded and the case in which a subset of qualities is
traded.
a) All N + 1 qualities traded :
If all qualities are traded, sellers’ ICC ensure that pq > v(q) for all qualities except,
possibly, quality N . Thus, for q < N , sellers’ ICC and lemma 5 imply:
J(pq) = J(pq−1)
u(q − 1)− v(q − 1)− k
u(q)− v(q − 1)− k . (A.37)
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Unless quality N is the only quality in argminq∈{1,...,N} u(q) − v(q), pN > v(N) must
hold and (A.37) holds with equality for quality N as well. In the special case in which
N is the only quality in argminq∈{1,...,N} u(q)− v(q), J(pN) is between 0 and the value
implied by (A.37).




u(q − i− 1)− v(q − i− 1)− k
u(q − i)− v(q − i− 1)− k . (A.38)
Since k ≥ 0, the maximum value of J(pq) is achieved when k = 0. Thus, the probability






δq ≡ u(q − 1)− v(q − 1)
u(q)− v(q − 1) . (A.40)
Notice also that k = 0 implies pq = u(q) ∀q = 0, ..., N (i.e. buyers make zero surplus).
Assume k > 0, so that buyers make positive surplus at all prices. Then, all buyers
want to trade. Clearly, k > 0 can only emerge if K = 1 – otherwise sellers of quality
q = 0 could always profit from raising their price. Hence, the requirement that the
number of goods sold is equal to the number of goods bought (1) can be restated as
N∑
q=0
λqJ(pq) = θ, (A.41)
where J(pq) is given by (A.38) for q < N . J(pN) is also given by (A.38) unless N is the
only quality in argminq∈{1,...,N} u(q) − v(q), in which case J(pN) is between zero and
the value implied by (A.38). For the case in which all qualities are traded, finding an
equilibrium outcome is equivalent to finding a value k∗ for which (A.41) holds. From
(A.38), the LHS of equation (A.41) is monotonically decreasing in k, for k ∈ [0, kˆ],
where kˆ ≡ minq∈{0,...,N} u(q) − v(q). We note that simultaneous satisfaction of all
the participation constraints requires that k always lie in the interval [0, kˆ]. Given
monotonicity, there always exists at most one value k∗ in the above interval. This
also implies that if there exists an equilibrium, its outcome must be unique. As for
existence, consider the following. From (A.38), the LHS of expression (A.41) reaches
its maximum in the relevant interval when k = 0 and its minimum when k = kˆ.
Therefore, necessary and sufficient conditions for an interior solution are














u(q − i− 1)− v(q − i− 1)− kˆ









u(N−i)−v(N−i−1)−kˆ if argminq∈{1,...,N} u(q)− v(q) 6= {N}
0 if argminq∈{1,...,N} u(q)− v(q) = {N}
(A.44)
Otherwise, if one of the above conditions is not satisfied, the robust equilibrium
takes a different form. If condition (A.42) is not satisfied, then k must be equal to
zero and the equilibrium is characterized by pq = u(q) for all q = 0, 1, ..., N and
probabilities Jq given by (A.39). As Jq > 0 ∀q = 0, ..., N , all qualities are traded
also in this case. Thus, a sufficient condition for all qualities being traded is that θ is
high enough to ensure that (A.43) holds. Below, we show that this condition is also
necessary. In order to gather intuitions on condition (A.43), notice that it is always
satisfied when the gains from trade are nondecreasing in the quality since, in this case,
kˆ = u(0)− v(0) and the RHS is equal to λ0. Therefore, as long as λ0 < θ, an internal
solution in which all qualities are traded must exist.
b) More than one and less than N + 1 qualities are traded :
Assume now that θ is relatively small so that condition (A.43) is not satisfied. If the
value of the RHS of equation (A.43) for k = kˆ is greater than or equal to θ, then
some qualities are not traded. To see this, note that k cannot exceed kˆ. Let Jq be
the probability to sell at pq when k equals kˆ. Let also qˆ be the lowest quality in
argminq∈{0,...,N} u(q) − v(q). Then, by definition, u(qˆ) − v(qˆ) − kˆ = 0 so that, from
equation (A.38), Jq is zero for all q > qˆ. Thus, when k = kˆ, all qualities above the
quality which provides the lowest gain from trade are not traded. Buyers’ surplus k
should increase, however it fails to increase because, by increasing, it would violate
the participation constraint of sellers of type qˆ. Hence, the incentive compatibility for
type qˆ requires that no higher quality is traded. Thus, (A.43) is a necessary condition
for all qualities being traded.
What are the characteristics of the equilibrium when (A.43) is violated? Note that






λqJq > θ, (A.45)
where the equality comes from the fact that all qualities higher than qˆ are not traded.
This suggests that even if only qˆ+1 qualities are traded out ofN+1, the quantity sold is
still higher than the quantity bought. Then, quality qˆ cannot be traded in equilibrium.
Let us assume that quality qˆ − 1 is traded. It follows that its price, pqˆ−1, must be
compatible with D1. In other words, there must be no incentive to deviate for sellers of
type qˆ or above. Therefore, pqˆ−1 must be such that k1 ≡ u(qˆ−1)−pqˆ−1 ≥ u(qˆ)− v(qˆ).
If so, there is no price sellers of type qˆ could possibly announce to attract buyers and
still make no loss. Of course, buyers incentive compatibility implies u(q)− pq = k1 for
all qualities that are traded, i.e. q = 0, ..., qˆ − 1. Now, let q˜ be the lowest quality in
argminq∈{0,...,qˆ−1} u(q)−v(q), i.e. the lowest quality among those which give minimum
gain from trade when attention is restricted to qualities lower than qˆ. It is clear that
k1 should now satisfy u(qˆ) − v(qˆ) ≤ k1 ≤ u(q˜) − v(q˜). Therefore, all that remains to






u(q − i− 1)− v(q − i− 1)− k∗1
u(q − i)− v(q − i− 1)− k∗1
= θ. (A.46)
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If it does, then the equilibrium is such that qualities q = 0, ..., qˆ − 1 are traded. If
it does not, then all the process starts again by choosing q˜ as the first quality that
is not traded. It should be noted that, since we are assuming θ > λ0, the process
eventually leads to an equilibrium in which more than one quality is traded. In fact,
as long as θ > λ0, qualities 0 and 1 are always traded. By iterating this process, one
can show that the number of qualities traded in equilibrium decreases with θ. Thus,
price dispersion increases as θ increases.
The extension to N + 1 qualities generalizes the result of an inverse relationship
between price dispersion and the degree of competition (as measured by θ) derived for
the case of two qualities. When competition among sellers is so strong that θ ≤ λ0,
only the lowest quality is traded and there is no price dispersion. When competition
is weak (θ satisfies condition (A.43)) all qualities are traded and price dispersion is
maximized. For intermediate values of θ such that θ > λ0 while (A.43) is not satisfied,




[1] Adriani, F., and L. G. Deidda, 2006. Competition and the Signaling Role of Prices.
DeFiMS discussion paper.
[2] Adriani, F., and L. G. Deidda, 2009. Price Signaling and the Strategic Benefits of
Price Rigidities. Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
[3] Akerlof, G. A. 1970. The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 84: 488-500.
[4] Bagwell, K. 1991. Optimal Export Policy for a New-Product Monopoly. American
Economic Review. 81: 1156-1169.
[5] Bagwell, K. and M.H. Riordan 1991. High and Declining Prices Signal Product
Quality. American Economic Review. 81: 224-239.
[6] Banks, J., and J. Sobel, 1987. Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games. Econo-
metrica. 55: 647-662.
[7] Baye, M.R., J. Morgan, and P. Scholten, 2004. Price Dispersion in the Small and in
the Large: Evidence from an Internet Price Comparison Site. Journal of Industrial
Economics. 52: 463-96.
[8] Bester, H., 1993. Bargaining versus Price Competition in Markets with Quality
Uncertainty. American Economic Review. 83: 278-288.
[9] Cho, I. K., and D. M. Kreps, 1987. Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics. 102: 179-221.
[10] Cho, I. K., and J. Sobel, 1990. Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling
Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 50: 381-413.
[11] Clay K.,R. Krishnan, and E. Wolff, 2001. Prices and Price Dispersion on the
Web: Evidence from the Online Book Industry. Journal of Industrial Economics.
49:521-539.
[12] Cooper R., and T.W. Ross, 1984. Prices, Product Qualities, and Asymmetric
Information: The Competitive Case. Review of Economic Studies 51: 197-207.
[13] Daughety, A. F, and J. F. Reinganum, 2005. Imperfect Competition and Quality
Signaling. Rand Journal of Economics. 39: 163-183.
[14] Daughety, A. F, and J. F. Reinganum, 2007. Competition and confidentiality:
Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information. Games
and Economic Behaviour 58: 94-120.
[15] Ellingsen, T. 1997. Price Signals Quality: The Case of Perfectly Inelastic Demand.
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 16: 43-61.
[16] Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole, 1991. Game Theory. MIT Press.
[17] Grossman, S. J., and M. Perry, 1986. Perfect Sequential Equilibrium. Journal of
Economic Theory. 39: 97-119.
44
[18] Gul F., and A. Postlewaite, 1993. Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange
Economies with Asymmetric Information. Econometrica. 60: 1273-1292.
[19] Hellmann, T., and J. Stiglitz, 2000. Credit and equity rationing in markets with
adverse selection. European Economic Review Volume 44: 281-304.
[20] Huck, S., Lnser, G.K., and J.-R. Tyran, 2007. Pricing and Trust. Mimeo.
[21] Janssen, M. C. W., and S. Roy, 2002. Dynamic trading in a Durable Good Market
with Asymmetric Information. International Economic Review. 43: 257-282.
[22] Judd, K. L., 1985. The law of large numbers with a continuum of IID random
variables. Journal of Economic theory. 35: 19-25.
[23] Kohlberg E., and J.-F. Mertens, 1986. On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria.
Econometrica. 54: 1003-1038.
[24] Laffont, J.- J., and E. Maskin. 1987. Monopoly with Asymmetric Information
about Quality. European Economic Review. 31: 483-489.
[25] Laffont, J.-J., and E. Maskin. 1989. Rational Expectations with Imperfect Infor-
mation. Economics Letters. 30: 269-274.
[26] Lin, Y.C., and P. Scholten. 2005. Pricing Behaviors of Firms on the Internet.
Evidence from Price Comparison Sites Cnet and Nextag. Mimeo.
[27] Mailath, G. J., Okuno-Fujiwara M., and A. Postlewaite. 1993. Belief-Based Re-
finements in Signaling Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 60: 241-276.
[28] Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. 1986. Price and Advertising Signals of Product
Quality. Journal of Political Economy. 94: 796-821.
[29] Moreno, D., and J. Wooders. 2007. Decentralized Trade Mitigates the Lemons
Problem. Universidad Carlos III.
[30] Muthoo, A., and S. Mutuswami. 2005. Competition and Efficiency in Markets
with Quality Uncertainty. Mimeo.
[31] Overgaard P. B., 1993. Price as a Signal of Quality: a Discussion of Equilibrium
Concepts in Signalling Games. European Journal of Political Economy. 9: 483-504.
[32] Stiglitz, J. and A. Weiss, 1981. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect In-
formation. American Economic Review. 71: 393-410.
[33] Villeneuve, B., 2005. Competition Between Insurers with Superior Information.
European Economic Review. 49: 321-340.
[34] Wilson, C., 1979. Equilibrium and Adverse Selection. American Economic Review.
69: 313-317.
[35] Wilson, C., 1980. The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection.
Bell Journal of Economics. 11: 108-130.
[36] Wolinsky, A., 1983. Prices as Signals of Product Quality. Review of Economic
Studies. 50: 647-658.
45
Figure 1: Equilibrium prices as a function of θ
Case a:  0>γ   
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Figure 2: Quality of trade as a function of θ
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